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From copyright protection to error concealment, video data hiding has found usage in a great number of applications. In this
work, we introduce the detailed framework of using data hiding for privacy information preservation in a video surveillance
environment. To protect the privacy of individuals in a surveillance video, the images of selected individuals need to be erased,
blurred, or re-rendered. Such video modiﬁcations, however, destroy the authenticity of the surveillance video. We propose a
new rate-distortion-based compression-domain video data hiding algorithm for the purpose of storing that privacy information.
Using this algorithm, we can safeguard the original video as we can reverse the modiﬁcation process if proper authorization
can be established. The proposed data hiding algorithm embeds the privacy information in optimal locations that minimize the
perceptual distortion and bandwidth expansion due to the embedding of privacy data in the compressed domain. Both reversible
and irreversible embedding techniques are considered within the proposed framework and extensive experiments are performed
to demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of the techniques.
Copyright © 2009 Jithendra K. Paruchuri et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
cited.
1.Introduction
Video Surveillance has become a part of our daily lives.
Closed-circuit cameras are mounted in countless shopping
malls for deterring crimes, at toll booths for assessing tolls,
and at traﬃc intersections for catching speeding drivers.
Since the 9–11 terrorist attack, there have been much
research eﬀorts directed at applying advanced pattern recog-
nition algorithms to video surveillance. While the objective
is to turn the labor intensive surveillance monitoring process
into a powerful automated system for counter-terrorism,
there is a growing concern that the new technologies
can severely undermine individual’s rights of privacy. The
combination of ubiquitous cameras, wireless connectivity,
and powerful recognition algorithms makes it easier than
ever to monitor every aspect of our daily activities.
M. W. Hail has conducted a recent survey assessing
citizens across demographic groups to see if they were com-
fortablewiththeexpansionofgovernmentvideosurveillance
if it protected privacy rights. (The survey was a cooperative
eﬀort through the University of Kentucky annual Kentucky
Survey and the research was sponsored by a grant from the
US Department of Homeland Security through the National
Institute for Hometown Security.) The survey research
was conducted utilizing a modiﬁed list-assisted Waksberg-
Mitofsky random-digit dialing procedure for sampling and
the population surveyed was noninstitutionalized Kentuck-
ians eighteen years of age and older. The margin of error
is ±3.3% at the 95% conﬁdence interval. The respondents
were asked, “Do you have a video security system that is
used routinely?” The results reﬂected that 55% of employed
Kentuckians have an operative video surveillance system at
their workplace. We then asked of those employed, “Would
you be interested in a video surveillance system at work
if you knew it could protect an individual’s privacy?” The
solid majority of 60% expressed that they were interested
in privacy protecting video surveillance. Urban residents,
those in higher income levels, and those with advanced2 EURASIP Journal on Information Security
education attainment all were more disposed to privacy
protecting video technology. Additionally, focus groups of
law enforcement, ﬁrst responders, hospitals, and public
infrastructure managers have all reﬂected strong interest in
privacy protecting video technology.
To mitigate public’s concern on privacy violation, it
is thus imperative to make privacy protection a priority
in developing new surveillance technologies. There have
been many recent work in enhancing privacy protection in
surveillance systems [1–8]. Many of them share the common
theme of identifying sensitive information and applying
image processing schemes for obfuscating that sensitive
information. However, the security ﬂaw overlooked in most
of these current systems is that they fail to consider the
security impact of modifying the surveillance videos. There
are a number of security measures that must be incorporated
before such modiﬁcations can be deployed. Firstly, mech-
anisms must be in place to authenticate modiﬁed videos
so that no one can falsify a diﬀerent modiﬁed video by
adding and deleting images of objects or individuals. We
call this measure privacy data authentication. The second
measure is that the original video must be preserved and
can only be retrieved under proper authorization. This is of
paramount importance to any privacy protection schemes as
allschemesareselectiveinthesensethatthesensitivecontent
are intended to a certain group for a certain purpose. No
content should be permanently erased. For example, in a
corporation, the security camera oﬃcer may have access to
video contents of all visitors but not the employees; the chief
privacy oﬃcer will have access to video contents of visitors
and all employees except for the executive team but the law
enforcement, with a proper order from the court, will have
access to the true original footage. It has been postulated that
such a static privacy policy would not be suﬃcient in more
sophisticatedenvironmentsorothersharingapplicationslike
teleconference where each participant might need to control
theaccessibilitycapabilityofeachconsumerofthecontentas
in [9]. We call this measure privacy data preservation.
As explained earlier, except for the simplest organization,
merely keeping the original video in encrypted form will
not be suﬃcient in addressing these needs. On the other
hand, it is advantageous to reuse the infrastructure of
existing standard based video surveillance systems as much
as possible. In this work, we propose using video data hiding
for preserving the privacy information in the modiﬁed
video itself in a seamless fashion. Using data hiding, the
video bit stream will be accessible for both regular and
authorizeddecodersbutonlythelatercanretrievethehidden
privacy information. The use of data hiding for privacy
data preservation makes it completely independent from the
obfuscation step unlike in some other work [10, 11]. Also,
the presence of a single bit stream makes the process of video
authentication much simpler to handle. Digitally signing the
data hidden bit stream will authenticate the original video as
well as all levels of privacy protected data.
From copyright protection to error concealment, video
data hiding has found usage in a great number of appli-
cations. However, the application of using data hiding
for privacy data preservation is unique in the sense it
requires huge amount of information to be embedded in
the video without disturbing the compression bit syntax.
Since data hiding disturbs the underlying statistical patterns
of the source data, it adversely aﬀects the performance of
compression which are designed based on the statistical
properties of the data. As such, it is imperative to design a
data hiding scheme that is compatible with the compression
algorithm and at the same time, introduces as little
perceptual distortion as possible. In this paper, we propose
a novel compression-domain video data-hiding algorithm
that determines the optimal embedding strategy to minimize
both the output perceptual distortion and the output bit
rate. The hidden data is embedded into selective Discrete
Cosine Transform (DCT) coeﬃcients which are found in
most video compression standards. The coeﬃcients are
selected based on minimizing a cost function that combines
both distortion and bit rate via a user-controlled weighting.
Two methods are proposed—exhaustive search and fast
Lagrangian approximation. While the former produces
optimal results, the latter approach is signiﬁcantly faster and
amenable to real-time implementation. Also two diﬀerent
embedding approaches are discussed. The ﬁrst approach
produces better compression performance but causes ir-
reversible changes even for the authorized decoder while
the second approach is both imperceptible to the regular
decoder as well as completely reversible to the authorized
decoder. However, this additional reversibility comes only at
the cost of compression performance as the motion feedback
loop can no longer be used and hence this technique can be
applied only to intracoded frames or enhancement layers
in a scalable codec. This reversible embedding is especially
useful in certain applications where the data hiding cannot
change the cover data even at a bit level. We can summarize
the contributions of this paper as follows.
(1) Propose a Privacy-Protected Video Surveillance Sys-
tem which can authenticate and preserve the privacy
information.
(2) Propose a data hiding framework for managing
privacy information which can support any kind of
video modiﬁcation.
(3) Propose a compression domain data hiding algo-
rithm which oﬀers high level of hiding capacity by
embedding privacy information in selected trans-
form coeﬃcients optimized in terms of distortion
and bit-rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First in
Section 2, we brieﬂy review the state-of-the-art in privacy
protection and management systems and video data hiding.
In Section 3, we describe the higher level design of our
privacy protection system and its components. Section 4
introduces the data hiding framework for managing
privacy information and various embedding techniques and
perceptual distortion and rate models. Keeping the special
constraints of data hiding for this application in consider-
ation, we propose the optimization framework to ﬁnd the
embedding locations in Section 5. Experimental results are
presented in Section 6 followed by conclusions in Section 7.EURASIP Journal on Information Security 3
2. Related Work
In this section, we review existing work on visual pri-
vacy protection technologies followed by video data hiding
techniques. There is a recent surge of interest in selective
protection of visual objects in video surveillance. The
PrivacyCam surveillance system developed at IBM protects
privacy by revealing only the relevant information such as
object tracks or suspicious activities [8]. Such a system is
limited by the types of events it can detect and may have
problems balancing privacy protection with the particular
needs of a security oﬃcer. Alternatively, one can modify
the video to obfuscate the appearance of individuals for
privacy protection. In [1], the authors propose a privacy
protecting video surveillance system which utilizes RFID
sensors to identify incoming individuals, ascertains their
privacy preference speciﬁed in an XML-based privacy policy
database, and ﬁnally uses a simple video masking technique
to selectively conceal authorized individuals and display
unauthorized intruders in the video. While [1] may be the
ﬁrsttodescribeaprivacyprotectedvideosurveillancesystem,
there are a large body of work that utilize such kinds of video
modiﬁcation for privacy protection. They range from the use
of black boxes or large pixels in [2, 3]t oc o m p l e t eo b j e c t
removal as in [1]. New techniques have also been proposed
recently to replace a particular face with a generic face [6, 12]
or a body with a stick ﬁgure [7]o rc o m p l e t eo b j e c tr e m o v a l
followed by inpainting of background and other foreground
objects [13, 14].
All the afore-mentioned work target only at the modi-
ﬁcation of the video but not at the feasibility of recovering
original video securely. To securely preserve the original
video, selective scrambling of sensitive information using
a private key have been recently proposed in [10, 11, 15].
These schemes diﬀer in terms of the types of informa-
tion scrambled which leads to diﬀerent complexity and
compression performances—spatial pixels are scrambled
in [10], DCT signs and Wavelet coeﬃcients are used in
[11, 15], respectively. With the appropriate private key,
the scrambling can be undone to retrieve the original
video. These techniques have the advantages of simplicity
with modiﬁed regions clearly marked. However, there are
a number of drawbacks. First, similar to pixelation and
blocking, scrambling is unable to fully protect the privacy
of individuals, revealing their routes, motion, shape, and
even intensity levels [6]. Second, as obfuscation is usually the
ﬁrst step in a complex process chain of a smart surveillance
system,itintroducesartifactsthatcanaﬀecttheperformance
of subsequent image processing. Lastly, the coupling of
scrambling and data preservation prevents other obfuscation
schemes like object replacement or removal to be used.
Using data hiding for privacy data preservation is more
ﬂexible as it completely isolates preservation from modiﬁca-
tion. Since our introduction of using data hiding for privacy
data preservation in [16], there have been other work like [9,
17–20] that employ a similar approach. Data hiding has been
used in various applications such as copyright protection,
authentication, ﬁngerprinting, and error concealment. Each
application imposes a diﬀerent set of constraints in terms
of capacity, perceptibility, and robustness [21]. Privacy data
preservation certainly demands a large embedding capacity
as we are hiding an entire video bitstream in the modiﬁed
video. Perceptual quality of the embedded video is also of
g r e a ti m p o r t a n c ea si te ﬀects the usability of the video for
further processing. Robustness refers to the survivability
of the hidden data under various processing operations.
While it is a key requirement for applications like copyright
protection and authentication, it is of less concern to a
well-managed video surveillance system targeted to serve a
single organization. Thus, we are focusing mainly on high-
capacity fragile data hiding schemes. Another dimension
is the reversibility of the hiding process which dictates if
the embedded video can be fully restored after the hidden
data is removed. While irreversible data hiding usually
produces higher hiding capacity, reversible data hiding may
be important for maintaining the authenticity of the original
video. We shall consider both in this work.
Most irreversible data embedding and extracting appro-
aches can be classiﬁed into two classes—spread spectrum
andquantizationindexmodulation(QIM).Spreadspectrum
techniquestreatsthedatahidingproblemasthetransmission
of the hidden information over a communication channel
corrupted by the covered data [22]. QIM techniques use
diﬀerent quantization code-books to represent the covered
data with the selection of code-books based on the hidden
information[23].QIM-basedtechniquesusuallyhavehigher
capacities than spread-spectrum schemes. The capacity of
any QIM scheme is determined by the design of the quan-
tization schemes. In [24], the authors propose to hide large
volume of information into the nonzero DCT terms after
quantization. This method cannot provide suﬃcient embed-
ding capacity for our application because surveillance videos
have high temporal correlation with a very large fraction of
DCTcoeﬃcientsbeingzerointheintercodedframes.In[25],
the authors propose to implement the embedding in both
zeroandnon-zeroDCTcoeﬃcientsbutonlyinmacroblocks
with low inter frame velocity. This framework deals only
with minimizing perceptual distortion without considering
the increase in bit rate. Our initial scheme in [16]e m b e d s
the watermark bits at the high-frequency DCT coeﬃcients
during the compression process. Similar to [25], this method
works well in terms of maintaining the output video quality
b u ta ta ne x p e n s eo fm u c hh i g h e ro u t p u tb i tr a t e .
Reversible data embedding can be broadly classiﬁed into
three categories. The ﬁrst class of methods like [26, 27]b a s i -
cally use lossless compression to create space for data hiding.
Thekeyideaistoembedtherecoveryinformationalongwith
thehiddendatatoenablethereversibilityatthedecoder.This
method is not suitable for our application because of its low
capacity and that the information to be embedded is already
a compressed bit stream. The second class of methods like
[28, 29] work on residual expansion between pairs of coeﬃ-
cients in various transform domains. These methods assume
high correlation between coeﬃcients,hencemostofthepairs
would not overﬂow even after expanding the diﬀerence. The
drawbackoftheseschemesisthehigherperceptualdistortion
caused due to signiﬁcant changes in coeﬃcient values. The
third category of algorithms like [30] work on the concept4 EURASIP Journal on Information Security
of histogram bin shifting. This is suitable for our application
because the histogram of DCT residue is Laplacian so that
we can hide information at small-magnitude coeﬃcients
without imposing signiﬁcant perceptual distortion.
In Section 5, we describe a new approach of optimally
placing hidden information in the DCT domain that
simultaneously minimizes both the perceptual distortion
and output bitrate. Our algorithm considers both rate and
distortion and produces an optimal distribution of hidden
bits among various DCT blocks. Our main contribution
in the data hiding algorithm is an optimization framework
to combine both the distortion and rate together as a
single cost function and to use it in identifying the optimal
locations to hide data. This allows a signiﬁcant amount of
information to be embedded into compressed bitstreams
without disproportional increase in either output bit rate
or perceptual distortion. This algorithm works for both
irreversible and reversible embedding approaches.
3.PrivacyProtectedVideoSurveillance
In order to appreciate the role of privacy data preservation,
it is imperative to understand how it ﬁts into the overall
architecture of a privacy protected video surveillance system.
A high level description of our proposed system is shown
in Figure 1 and more details about this system can be found
in [31]. The system contains a subject identiﬁcation module
unit which uses RFID tags to identify and discriminate an
authorized user from others. The input video from the
camera units is processed to identify and extract out the
privacyinformationandtheemptyregionsleftbehindbythe
removal of objects are perceptually ﬁlled in the Obfuscation
Unit using video in-painting as proposed in [14]. The
privacy object information is sent to the Secure Data Hiding
unit to be encrypted and embedded inside the modiﬁed
video. This entire process is done within the secure camera
system, which is a trusted environment within which raw
privacy data or decryption keys are used. All the processing
units are connected through an open local area network,
and as such, all privacy information must be encrypted
before transmission and the identities of all involved units
must be validated. The Privacy Data Management System
provides the necessary key distribution and privacy policy
management so as to support selective and secure recovery
of original video based on the status and policy speciﬁed by
an individual user.
In this paper, we limit our discussion to the data hiding
unit used for integrating the privacy information with
the modiﬁed video. The privacy information contains
the image objects of the individuals carrying the RFID
tags, each padded with a black background to make a
rectangular frame and compressed using a H.263 version 2
video encoder [32]. The embedding process is performed
at frame level so that the decoder can reconstruct the
privacy information as soon as the compressed bitstream
of the same frame has arrived. Before the embedding, the
compressed bitstream for each object is encrypted using
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with a 128-bit
key and appended with a small ﬁxed-size header. Details
of the encryption process, key management and the header
format can be found in [31]. It is this encrypted data stream
that is embedded into the modiﬁed video. The data hiding
scheme is combined with the video encoder and produces
a H.263-compliant bitstream of the protected video to be
stored in the database. The privacy protected video can be
accessed without any restriction with a standard decoder as
all the privacy information are encrypted and hidden in the
bitstream. With a special decoder, the hidden data can be
retrieved and the authorized user can decrypt the privacy
information corresponding to his access level.
4. Hiding Privacy Information
In this section, we describe the various components in our
proposed data hiding unit. Figure 2 shows the overall design
of the data hiding unit and its interaction with the video
compression algorithm. Our data hiding is integrated with a
typical motion-compensated DCT video compression algo-
rithmsuchasH.263.InFigure 2,thepurpleareacontainsthe
components of the data hiding module while the green area
contains those of the compression module. There are two
inputs to this combined unit: the ﬁrst one is the Privacy Pro-
tected Video with the sensitive information already redacted.
The second input is the compressed video bitstreams of
the privacy information, encrypted based on the approach
describedinSection 3.Thegoalistohidethesecondinputin
theﬁrstinputinajointdata-hidingcompressionframework.
After the motion compensation process, the residue of the
privacy protected video is converted into the DCT domain.
The embedding step is introduced between the ﬁnal step of
entropy coding and the DCT. This ensures that the decoder
gets the same reference frame to prevent any drifting errors.
The encrypted video stream is hidden, using a modiﬁed
parity embedding scheme, in the luminance DCT blocks
which occupy the largest portion of the bit stream. The posi-
tions of embedding are obtained using an R-D optimization
framework to minimize the distortion and rate increase for
a target embedding requirement. The distortion is based on
human visual system and a perceptual mask in DCT domain
is used to facilitate the calculation. The distortion and rate
calculationsfortheR-Dblockandtheembeddingtechniques
are explained in the following subsections. The full details
of the optimization algorithm is given in Section 5.N o t e
that while the proposed data hiding algorithm is general
enough to be used in any video codec, the distortion and rate
calculations are speciﬁc to an H.263 codec.
4.1. Perceptual Distortion. To identify the embedding loca-
tions that cause the minimal disturbance to visual quality,
we need a distortion metric to input into our optimization
framework. Mean square distortion does not work for our
goal of ﬁnding the optimal DCT coeﬃcients to embed data
bits—as DCT is an orthogonal transform, the mean square
distortion for the same number of embedded bits will always
be the same regardless of which DCT coeﬃcients are used.
Instead, we adopt the DCT perceptual model proposed by
Watson [33], which has been shown to better correlateEURASIP Journal on Information Security 5
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Figure 1: High-level description of the proposed privacy-protecting video surveillance system.
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Figure 2: Schematic diagram of the data hiding and video compression system.
with the human visual system than standard mean square
distortion. While there are other more sophisticated video-
based perceptual models such as the one in [34], we adopt
the Watson model for its simplicity to be included in our
optimization algorithm.
The Watson model takes into account the overall lumi-
nance, contrast and frequency of a coeﬃcient, and calculates
ap e r c e p t u a lm a s ks(i, j,k) that indicates the maximum just-
noticeable change to c(i, j,k), the (i, j)th coeﬃcient of the
kth8 ×8D C Tb l o c ko fa ni m a g e :
s
 
i, j,k
 
= max
 
tL
 
i, j,k
 
,
   c(i, j,k)
   0.7tL
 
i, j,k
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c(0,0,k)
c0
 0.649
(2)
for i, j ∈{ 0,1,...,7}. Also, t(i, j) is the frequency sensitivity
threshold, c(0,0,k) is the DC term of block k,a n dc0 is
the average luminance of the image [21]. The higher the
mask value, the less distortion the corresponding coeﬃcient
will cost by embedding hidden data. As the embedding
is performed in the quantized coeﬃcient domain, it is
convenient to normalize with the quantization step-size and
use the following distortion value instead:
D
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 ,( 3 )
where QP is the quantization parameter and s(i, j,k) is the
perceptual mask value as calculated in (1). As a few highly
distorted coeﬃcients account for more distortion than many
mildly distorted ones [21], an L4 norm pooling is employed
for calculating the total distortion over the entire frame:
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4.2. Irreversible Embedding Process. To embed data in the
compressedbitstream,wefollowtheQIMapproachinwhich
quantization is altered based on the hidden data. Let c(i, j,k)
and q(i, j,k) be the (i, j)-th coeﬃcient of the kth DCT block
before and after quantization, respectively. They are related
as in (5) where QP is the chosen quantization parameter at
the codec:
q
 
i, j,k
 
=
 
c
 
i, j,k
 
+QP
2 ·QP
 
. (5)
The maximum error due to the quantization will be QP as
reconstruction values are centered in the quantization bins
of width 2 · QP. To enable the data hiding, the quantization
is made coarser with the ﬁner levels reserved to represent the
embeddedbits.ToembedanL-bitnumberV inacoeﬃcient,
the quantized coeﬃcient can be altered in two diﬀerent ways:
  q
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. (7)
The choice of embedding with (6)o r( 7) depends on which
method produces a reconstructed value closer to the real
c(i, j,k). Hidden data extraction is straightforward—for an
L-bit embedding in a particular coeﬃcient, it is given as in
(8):
x =   q
 
i, j,k
 
mod 2L. (8)
This embedding, however, is not invertible. Since the
quantization is altered to a coarser level as part of data
embedding, it causes irrecoverable loss of data. For a
single bit embedding, the maximum quantization noise
doubles compared to that of without embedding. Beside the
irreversible changes to the coeﬃcient, the modiﬁed reference
frame in the motion loop propagates the eﬀect of data hiding
into future frames, making the changes permanent. This
implies that the reconstructed video will be slightly diﬀerent
from the originally compressed version. Such an irreversible
embedding method is not suitable for certain applications
that demand the original video to be unaltered by the data
hiding process.
4.3. Reversible Embedding Process. Using the previous em-
bedding technique, the decoder has no way to remove the
distortion introduced by the embedding process. In this
subsection, we explain a reversible embedding algorithm
whose eﬀect can be reversed on the decoder side after data
extraction. A key requirement for our application is that the
output bit-stream with hidden data must be decodable with
good quality by a standard-compliant decoder unaware of
the embedding. This implies that we need to avoid any error
caused by drifting and as such, the decoded frame with the
hidden data must be used in the feedback path in the motion
loop. As the motion compensation does not respect the
DCT block boundary, the eﬀect of hiding one bit in a DCT
coeﬃcient may spread to diﬀerent spatial areas after many
frames. It is an open question on how to make this temporal
spreading reversible. In our current implementation, we
focus on making the DCT embedding process reversible and
prevent temporal spreading by restricting our attention to
either intracoded frames or intracoded-enhanced frames in
a two-layer scalable codec.
Thereversibleembeddingalgorithmexploitsthefactthat
DCT coeﬃcients follow a Laplacian distribution concen-
trated around zero with empty bins towards either ends of
the distribution [30]. Due to the high concentration at the
zero bin, we can embed high-volume of hidden data at the
zero coeﬃcients by shifting the bins right (or left) of zero to
theright(orleft).Attheencoderside,theembeddingprocess
is as follows: let Mk be the number of bits to be hidden in the
kth quantized DCT block. Let L =  Mk/Zk ,w h e r eZk is the
number of zero coeﬃcients in this DCT block. In a dynamic
order speciﬁed by optimization algorithm, we modify each
DCT coeﬃcients q(i, j,k) into   q(i, j,k) using the following
procedure until all the Mk bits of privacy data are embedded.
Notice that we have i = 0,1,...,7andj = 0,1,...,7,andk is
the DCT block index.
(1) If q(i, j,k)i sz e r o ,e x t r a c tL bits from the privacy data
buﬀer and set   q(i, j,k) = q(i, j,k)+2 L−1 − V,w h e r e
V is the decimal value of these L privacy data bits.
(2) If q(i, j,k) is negative, no embedding is done and
  q(i, j,k) = q(i, j,k) −2L−1 −1.
(3) If q(i, j,k) is positive, no embedding is done and
  q(i, j,k) = q(i, j,k)+2 L−1.
The embedding is done only at zero coeﬃcients while all
the other coeﬃcients visited in the scan order are displaced
in either positive or negative direction. Compared with the
irreversible embedding, the capacity here is smaller as data
can only be embedded to zero coeﬃcients. Also reversible
embedding induces higher distortion as even some nonzero
coeﬃcients must be altered by (2L +1)·QP without actually
embedding at that position.
On the decoder side, it needs to extract the hidden bits
and retrieve the original quantized coeﬃcient q(i, j,k)f r o m
  q(i, j,k). The decoder also knows the number of hidden bits
Mk by running the same rate distortion algorithm. To ﬁnd
the number of coeﬃcients that contain the hidden data, the
decoder determines the minimum   Zk such that   Zk · L ≥ Mk,
where   Zk is the number of DCT coeﬃcients satisfying the
condition −2L−1 <   q(i, j,k) ≤ 2L−1. Following the block
speciﬁc pattern given by the optimization algorithm, the
privacydataandtheoriginalDCTcoeﬃcientcanbeobtained
as follows.
(1) If −2L−1 <   q(i, j,k) ≤ 2L−1, L hidden bits can
be obtained as the binary equivalent of the decimal
number 2L−1 −   q(i, j,k)a n dq(i, j,k) = 0.
(2) If   q(i, j,k) ≤− 2L−1, no bit is hidden in this coe-
ﬃcient and q(i, j,k) =   q(i, j,k)+2 L−1 − 1.
(3) If   q(i, j,k) > 2L−1, no bit is hidden in this coeﬃcient
and q(i, j,k) =   q(i, j,k) −2L−1.EURASIP Journal on Information Security 7
4.4. Rate Model. Data hiding eﬀects the compression per-
formance—simply choosing the distortion-optimal loca-
tions based on the perceptual model may increase the
output bit-rate manyfold. As surveillance video is typically
quite static, many DCT blocks do not have any non-
zero coeﬃcients. Hiding bits into these zero blocks, while
perceptual optimal, may signiﬁcantly increase the bit-rate.
This is caused by the fragmentation of the long run-length
patterns which are assumed to be frequent by the entropy
coder. One possible approach to mitigate this problem is to
limit the number of blocks to be modiﬁed [16]. However,
the fewer blocks used for embedding, the more spatially
concentrated the embedding becomes which will make the
distortion more visible. As such, we need to measure the
increase in rate by diﬀerent embedding strategies so as
to produce the optimal tradeoﬀ with the distortion. The
rate increase for a particular embedding is calculated using
the actual entropy coder used for compression. As both
the encoder and the decoder need to compute the rate
function so as to derive the optimal data hiding positions,
the actual privacy data cannot be used as it is not available
at the decoder. Instead, we approximate the embedding by
assuming the “worst-case” embedding, that is, we choose the
hidden bit value that causes the higher increase in bit-rate.
5.Rate-Distortion-OptimizedDataHiding
In our joint data hiding and compression framework, we
aim at minimizing the output bit rate R and the perceptual
distortion D caused by embedding M bits into the DCT
coeﬃcients.Byusingauser-speciﬁedcontrolparameterδ,we
combine the rate and distortion into a single cost function as
follows:
C = (1 −δ) ·NF · D +δ ·R,( 9 )
whereNF isaconstantusedtoequalizethedynamicrangesof
D and R so that varying δ translates to trading-oﬀ between D
and R.A ss u c h ,NF is not a free parameter and is determined
based on the particular compression mechanism. On the
other hand, the choice of δ depends on applications—it is
selected based on the particular application which may favor
the least amount of distortion by setting δ close to zero,
or the least amount of bit rate increase by setting δ close
to one. In order to avoid any overhead in communicating
the embedding positions to the decoder, both of these
approaches compute the optimal positions based on the
previously decoded DCT frame so that the process can be
repeated at the decoder. In our data hiding framework, the
constrained optimization can be formulated as follows:
min
Γ
C(Γ) subjected to M = N, (10)
where M is the variable that denotes the number of coeﬃ-
cients to be modiﬁed, N is the target number of bits to be
embedded, C is the cost function as described in (9), and Γ is
any selection of M DCT coeﬃcients for embedding the data.
We assume that a constant number of bits are embedded at
eachDCTcoeﬃcientandfocustheoptimizationonchoosing
the coeﬃcients for embedding (with the exception of the last
DCT coeﬃcient for embedding which may contain less than
the target number). While it is entirely feasible to explore
the dimension of embedding diﬀerent numbers of bits to
diﬀerent coeﬃcients, our preliminary experiments indicate
that the gain is too small to justify the signiﬁcant expansion
of the search space for the optimization.
Lagrangian method turns a constrained optimization
problem like (10) into an unconstrained one, and is com-
monly used in rate-distortion optimized video compression.
Using a Lagrange Multiplier λ ≥ 0, the constrained
optimization problem introduced in (10) can be turned into
an unconstrained version:
min
Γ
Θ(Γ,λ) with Θ(Γ,λ) = C(Γ)+λ(M −N). (11)
If the unconstrained problem (11)f o rap a r t i c u l a rλ ≥ 0h a s
an optimal solution that gives rise to M = N, this will also
be a solution to the original constrained problem [35]. We
can further simplify (11) by decomposing it into the sum of
similar quantities from each DCT block k:
Θ(Γ,λ) =
 
k
Ck(Γk)+λ
⎛
⎝
 
k
Mk −N
⎞
⎠, (12)
=
 
k
 
Ck(Γk)+λ
 
Mk −
N
L
  
, (13)
where Γk denotes the particular selection of Mk coeﬃcient in
the kth DCT block and L is the total number of DCT blocks
inaframe.Theminimizationcannowbeperformedforeach
blockatdiﬀerentvaluesofλsoastomake
 
k Mk = N.Ther e
aretwosubproblemshere.First,whilethesecondtermonthe
right side in (13) is constant for a particular value of λ, the
minimization of the ﬁrst term is not trivial. In other words,
we need to ﬁnd an optimal subset of Mk coeﬃcients in the
kth DCT block to minimize the cost:
C
∗
k (Mk) = min
Γk
Ck(Γk). (14)
The second problem is an eﬃcient way to search for λ that
provides an optimal allocation of embedded bits to each
block. The following two subsections describe our approach
in tackling these problems.
5.1. Cost Function Computation for DCT Blocks. There are
two components to the cost function introduced in (9):
distortion and rate increase due to data hiding. Our dis-
tortion function as described in (4) is additive with each
coeﬃcient having an independent contribution. The rate
increase due to the modiﬁcation of a coeﬃcient is far more
complex. It depends on neighboring coeﬃcients as consec-
utive coeﬃcients along the zigzag scan are encoded together
as a single run-length pattern. In the H.263 standard, a run-
lengthpatternisdeﬁnedasarunofzerocoeﬃcientsfollowed
by a nonzero coeﬃcient. The length of the run and the
nonzero coeﬃcient determine the length of the codeword,
and the longer the run-length, the shorter the codeword in
the Huﬀman table becomes. Embedding a bit in any zero8 EURASIP Journal on Information Security
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coeﬃcients will break the run-length pattern into two and
the bit-rate increase will depend on the original and the
resulting run-length patterns.
At ﬁrst glance, the interdependency created by the run-
length coding seems to evade any structural exploitation
of the optimization problem. Exhaustive search of
  K
M
 
patterns, where K is the number of candidate coeﬃcients
and M is the number of embedded bits, seems inevitable.
For a 8 × 8 DCT block, such an exhaustive search will need
to encode more than 1019 patterns in order to determine
all the optimal positions for embedding M = 1,2,...,64
bits. This is clearly impossible in practice. Fortunately, the
“worst-case” embedding assumption in our rate model as
described in Section 4.4 provides a Dynamic-Programming-
(DP-) based solution to the optimization problem. In the
actual embedding procedure as described in (6)a n d( 7),
embedding a speciﬁc bit may turn a nonzero DCT coeﬃcient
into zero and actually reduces the bit-rate by making a run-
length pattern longer. The “worst-case” embedding, which is
employed without the knowledge of the hidden bit, assumes
the worst case and never makes a nonzero coeﬃcient zero.
This simple observation enables us to develop a recursive
solution to the optimization problem based on the position
of the last embedded bit.
Let f(s,M) denotes the minimum cost of embedding M
bits into a DCT block with the last bit embedded at the sth
DCTcoeﬃcientalongthezigzagscan.Clearly,theoptimalcost
C∗(M) of embedding M bits in this block can be found by
the following equation:
C
∗(M) = min
s=1,...,64 f(s,M) (15)
(since the approach of computing the cost function is
the same for each block, we drop the block index k in
representing the block cost function C
∗
k (Mk)).
Here we assume all 64 coeﬃcients are available for
embedding which is the case for irreversible embedding. For
reversible embedding, we can simply limit our candidates
to the zero coeﬃcients. With the worst-case embedding, the
embedding pattern that realizes f(s,M) must have a non-
zero sth DCT coeﬃcient. Denote t<sto be the embedding
position of the M − 1st embedded bit. Since the tth DCT
coeﬃcient must also be non-zero, the run-length patterns
before and after the tth coeﬃcients are independently coded.
Let d(t,s) be the cost induced by the run-length patterns
between the tth and sth coeﬃcients. We can now compute
f(s,M) using the following recursion:
f(s,M) = min
t<s
 
f(t,M −1)+d(t,s)
 
. (16)
ThisispreciselytheBellmanprinciplethatleadstoadynamic
programming formulation to solve for f(s,M)[ 36]. Now
we can state the full algorithm to compute C∗(M)f o rM =
1,2,...,64 as follows.
(1) There are 64 stages with each stage representing
the embedding of one bit. At stage M where M =
1,2,...,64, there are 65 − M states representing all
possible DCT coeﬃcients in the zigzag order that
can store the Mth embedded bit. The minimum
cost function f(s,M) will be computed at stage M
and state s. The trellis depicting this construction is
shown in Figure 3.
(2) The calculation starts from stage one. At stage M,w e
compute the cost function at state s by ﬁrst worst-
case embedding a bit at the sth coeﬃcient and then
identifying the minimum combined cost among all
the states up to s−1 in stage M−1 plus the extra cost
incurred by the embedding at the sth coeﬃcient.
(3) Finally, the minimum cost of embedding M bits can
becalculatedbyminimizingoverallthestatesinstage
M.
To compute the complexity of this DP algorithm, we
note that 64 DCT coding patterns are examined in the ﬁrst
stage, 1 + 2 + ···+6 3= 2016 in the second stage, 1 + 2 +
···+6 2= 1953 in the third and so forth. Altogether one
needs to examine 43744 diﬀerent DCT encoding patterns
to determine the minimum cost embedding. While this is
a signiﬁcant reduction from the naive exhaustive search,
encoding one single DCT blocks so many times is still
formidable in practice. In our experiments, we have also
investigated two more strategies in computing the block cost
function: the greedy approximation and a ﬁxed heuristic
order within a DCT block. Greedy embedding calculates
one optimal embedding location at a time ignoring the
complex rate dependencies while heuristic approach takes a
ﬁxed reverse zig-zag scan order from the end of the DCT
block. Table 1 summarizes the diﬀerences in the number
DCT patterns examined among all the approaches.
5.2. Bit Allocation by Lagrangian Approximation. Sweeping
through λ from 0 to ∞ will examine the convex hull of all
the block cost functions C
∗
k (Mk). While there exist eﬃcient
tree pruning techniques to search for the optimal value
λ, the large number of DCT blocks in a frame can still
render such techniques computationally intensive. As we will
demonstrate in Section 6, the block cost functions in mostEURASIP Journal on Information Security 9
Table 1: Number of DCT patterns examined by diﬀerent algo-
rithms in computing C∗(M).
Approach Number of DCT patterns examined
Exhaustive search >1019
Dynamic programming 43,744
Greedy 2,080
Fixed pattern 64
cases can be well approximated by a second order curve. This
allowsustodeviseasimplesearchstrategytoquicklyidentify
the appropriate value of λ.
If one can approximate C
∗
k (Mk) function as a diﬀer-
entiable function in the continuous domain Mk, then the
optimal solution to (13) must satisfy the so-called “equal-
slope” criteria:
dC
∗
k
dMk
=− λ (17)
for all k.H o w e v e r ,( 17) implies that the optimal solution
exists at a constant equal slope of −λ for all block cost func-
tions. At an equal slope on all the individual cost funcions,
the rate of increase or decrease in cost with respect to the
bits embedded will be the same. Hence, we need to search
for such constant slope over all the curves which satisfy
thetotaltargetembeddingrequirement.Approximatingeach
cost function as a second-order polynomial yields
C
∗
k (Mk) ≈ ak ·M2
k +bk ·Mk +ck. (18)
The optimal slope that satisﬁes our embedding constraint
c a nt h u sb eo b t a i n e da sf o l l o w s :
dC
∗
k (Mk)
dMk
= 2 ·ak · Mk +bk =− λ. (19)
To meet the minimum embedding constraint, the total
number of bits embedded from each DCT block must be
equal to N:
N =
 
k
Mk =− λ ·
 
k
 
1
2 ·ak
 
−
 
k
 
bk
2 ·ak
 
. (20)
Thus, λ can be determined as follows:
λ =−
N +
 
k[bk/(2 · ak)]
 
k[1/(2 ·ak)]
. (21)
Since the actual problem is a discrete one, we can only use
λ from (21) as an initial slope and search for the exact
slope in its neighborhood to match our target embedding
requirement. At this optimal slope on each curve, we can
identify the number of embedding locations Mk for each
DCT block. These Mk embedding locations within each
block are chosen from the same optimal order which are
already calculated during the cost cuve generation process.
6. Experiments
We have tested our proposed schemes on six sequences using
a variety of video obfuscation techniques. These sequences
include the following.
Minnesota [37]. Two persons walk towards and cross
each other while the camera is slowly panning (39
frames).
Board. One person walk across the scene, brieﬂy
occluded by a partition board (101 frames).
Two-persons. Two persons walk towards and cross
each other (89 frames).
Three-persons. Two persons walk towards the right
and one to the left, occluding each other brieﬂy (73
frames).
Conference. Five persons sit around a conference
table with two leaving one after the other (356
frames).
Hall. A standard sequence used in video compression
(299 frames).
A l ls e q u e n c e sa r ei nC I F( 3 5 2× 288) format in YCbCr color
space with 4 : 2 : 0 sub-sampling. The ﬁrst four sequences
are captured at 15Hz and the hall monitor is at 30Hz.
For each sequence, privacy objects are extracted according
to a separate segmentation mask. The segmentation mask
of Minnesota is provided by the authors of [37]a n d
that of Board is manually obtained. The remainders are
calculated using the background subtraction and object
segmentation schemes described in [14]. The experiments
assume all the privacy objects are compressed together in
the same privacy bitstream. In practice, multiple persons
in the scene would result in multiple bitstreams which
will add complexity and payload to the whole process.
Using MPEG-4 object-based coding can certainly reduce
this payload requirement. Complexity can be reduced by
parallelizing the compression of diﬀerent objects. Three
video obfuscation techniques are then applied after the
privacy objects are removed. They are (a) silhouette in which
the holes are replaced by black pixels, (b) scrambled in which
the pixel values are exclusive-OR with a pseudo-random
sequence, and (c) in-painted using an object-based video
in-painting scheme from [14]. The original sequences,
privacy objects and obfuscated sequences are shown in
Figure 4 and are available for download at the authors’
website (http://www.vis.uky.edu/∼cheung/datahiding/).
The data hiding algorithm is implemented based on
the TMN Coder Version 3.0 of the ITU-T H.263 version
2 by University of British Columbia. All sequences are
compressed using a constant quantization parameter with
the ﬁrst frame intracoded and the remaining intercoded.
Despite the diﬀerences in the original frame-rates among the
sequences, the compression frame rate has been set to 30Hz.
The encoding performance is measured based on running
the program on a Windows XP Professional machine with
Intel Xeon Processor at 2GHz with 4GB memory.
6.1. Selection of DCT Coeﬃcients for Embedding. In the ﬁrst
experiment, we consider the performances among diﬀerent
schemes in selecting DCT coeﬃcients to embed hidden data.
The three tested schemes are the DP-based optimal scheme,
the greedy scheme and the ﬁxed reversed zigzag patterns as
described in Section 5.10 EURASIP Journal on Information Security
Figure 4: Diﬀerent privacy protected sequences used in experiments: the ﬁrst column shows the privacy information; the second column
shows the sensitive areas replaced by silhouette; the third column shows the sensitive areas scrambled and the last column shows the sensitive
areas in-painted.
Figure 5 shows a typical graph of the cost function versus
the number of bits embedded within a single DCT block
for each of the three schemes. (The graphs show the results
of the 100th DCT block from the Minnesota in-painted
sequence but the trend is typical among all sequences we
have tested.) The cost function is computed according to
(9)w i t hδ = 0.5a n dNF = 25. For a ﬁxed number
of hidden bits, the zigzag scheme clearly produces worse
results than both the greedy and the DP-based schemes.
The greedy and the DP-based schemes however produce
very similar results. The corresponding curves are almost
convex which strongly suggests the optimality in using the
discrete Lagrangian optimization for allocating hidden bits
among diﬀerent blocks. In addition, the curves can be well
approximated by a quadratic curve as shown in the Figure 5,
hence justifying the approximation we have introduced in
Section 5.2.
To further demonstrate the diﬀerences among these
schemes, we have run them on four diﬀerent in-painted
sequences to their entirety, focusing only on the irreversibleEURASIP Journal on Information Security 11
Table 2: Comparing the performances among DP-optimal, Greedy, and Zigzag on four diﬀerent in-painted sequences.
In-painted sequences Minnesota Board Two-persons Three-persons
Bitrate (kbps)
DP optimal 927.3 96.9 344.8 472.3
Greedy 933.5 96.1 345.8 473.1
Zigzag 937.2 97.0 340.0 463.2
PSNR-Y (dB)
DP optimal 31.83 37.73 35.37 34.30
Greedy 31.84 37.80 35.36 34.31
Zigzag 31.62 37.73 35.33 34.28
Distortion
DP optimal 30.69 18.50 22.88 30.61
Greedy 30.84 18.83 22.95 30.46
Zigzag 42.96 22.43 29.67 38.55
Cost (NF = 25)
DP optimal 731.7 252.5 438.4 591.6
Greedy 736.7 256.3 439.7 590.2
Zigzag 889.9 301.7 520.8 686.3
Speed (sec/frame)
DP optimal 904.3 890.1 892.0 892.9
Greedy 35.5 35.2 34.8 35.1
Zigzag 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5
Table 3: Comparing the performances between Lagrangian and Equal distribution of hidden data among DCT blocks.
In-painted sequences Minnesota Board Two-persons Three-persons
Bitrate (kbps) Lagrangian 945.81 97.84 361.64 511.06
Equal 1696.04 127.71 1018.67 1208.75
PSNR-Y (dB) Lagrangian 31.84 37.69 35.41 34.16
Equal 31.34 37.68 34.28 33.45
Distortion Lagrangian 27.72 15.48 20.15 26.52
Equal 18.86 14.80 16.65 16.26
embedding with the quantization parameter ﬁxed at QP =
10. For all the DP-based, greedy, and zigzag schemes, we
use the discrete Lagrangian-based bit allocation method as
described in Section 5.2. Table 2 summarizes the compar-
isons in terms of the resulting bitrate after compression with
embedding, the average luma PSNR after compression and
embedding, the perceptual distortion as deﬁned in (4), the
averagecostovertheentiresequence,andtheencodingspeed
in seconds per frame. There are relatively little diﬀerences
among the three schemes in bitrate and PSNR. The zigzag
scheme produces higher distortion and cost while the DP-
based and the greedy schemes produce very similar results
as expected. On the other hand, the encoding speeds are
exactly the opposite—the DP-based scheme needs around
895 seconds per frame, the greedy scheme needs 35 seconds,
and the zigzag needs only 1.5 second. Due to the high
computational complexity of the DP-based scheme, we focus
on using the greedy scheme rather than the DP-based
approach for the remaining experiments.
We should point out that the computational speeds
provided in Table 2 are based on a nonoptimized imple-
mentation of the algorithms and also include the entire
compression process, which amounts to roughly 0.6 sec-
ond. Signiﬁcant speedup can be achieved, for example,
by updating only those blocks that are diﬀerent from the
previous frames as indicated by the macroblock modes.
In fact, as the motion in typical surveillance videos is
scarce, it is conceivable to update the cost function only
occasionally rather than at every frame without losing much
optimality. Furthermore, the complexity is mainly due to the
computation of the cost functions for diﬀerent DCT blocks
which are certainly amenable to parallel implementation.
While it is not the focus of this paper on the real-time
implementation of the data hiding process, we believe that
signiﬁcant improvement in computational speed is indeed
possible.
6.2. Bit Allocation for DCT Blocks. Our optimization process
is a combination of two steps—bit allocation between
blocks and choosing optimal the positions within blocks
as explained in Sections 5.2 and 5.1,r e s p e c t i v e l y .W h i l e
the ﬁrst experiment focuses on diﬀerent approaches of
embedding within a single block, we consider in the
second experiment the eﬀect of diﬀerent approaches in12 EURASIP Journal on Information Security
Table 4: Comparing the performances among diﬀerent video obfuscation schemes.
In-painted sequences Minnesota Board Two-persons Three-persons Conference Hall
PSNR-Y (dB)
Silhouette 34.87 38.47 38.13 37.54 35.72 35.15
Scrambled 31.58 35.74 34.65 33.77 34.61 33.49
In-painted 31.84 37.80 35.36 34.31 34.96 33.43
PSNR-Y drop %
Silhouette 9.7 1.8 8.4 9.7 2.4 3.8
Scrambled 8.3 1.2 5.0 5.5 2.0 3.2
In-painted 9.7 1.3 9.7 11.2 2.5 3.6
Distortion
Silhouette 28.14 18.29 22.71 28.84 27.11 28.97
Scrambled 25.47 14.72 17.76 17.96 19.30 20.35
In-painted 30.85 18.83 22.95 30.46 27.29 28.53
Bitrate (kbps)
Silhouette 1087.0 92.4 387.5 587.2 145.2 315.0
Scrambled 1301.2 822.9 798.4 1124.3 359.8 1113.0
In-painted 933.5 96.1 345.8 473.1 127.7 285.2
Bitrate increase %
Silhouette 61.9 29.2 91.6 78.9 31.1 45.5
Scrambled 27.1 1.4 −1.4 −0.8 −3.0 −4.1
In-painted 87.0 26.2 115.8 111.2 44.6 59.6
Mark-to-work bitrate
Silhouette 0.66 0.44 1.46 1.07 0.53 0.60
Scrambled 0.35 0.02 0.17 0.18 0.12 0.08
In-painted 1.16 0.40 3.00 3.13 0.77 0.83
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Figure 5: Cost function versus number of bits embedded in a DCT
block for diﬀerent embedding scheme.
allocating bits among diﬀerent blocks. To minimize the
impact of data hiding on visual quality, [16] divides hidden
data equally among all the blocks in the residual frame.
We compare this scheme with the proposed Lagrangian
approach and the results are shown in Table 3.T oe n s u r ea
fair comparison, we ﬁx the greedy approach with λ = 0t o
enforce a full emphasis on minimizing the visual distortion.
Figure 6: Visual Diﬀerence between two frames after embedding
showing better correlation to Perceptual Distortion measure com-
p a r e dt oP S N R .L e f t :P S N R= 34.28, D = 16.65; Right: PSNR =
34.71, D = 149.64.
While the equal distribution can indeed provide smaller
distortion, the major diﬀerence lies in the reduction of
bandwidth. On average there is a bandwidth savings of 47%
when switching from equal distribution to the Lagrangian
approach.
6.3. Diﬀe r e n tP r i v a c yP r o t e c t i o nS c h e m e s . In the third exper-
iment, we contrast the performances of the greedy scheme
over diﬀerent privacy protection schemes. As one of the key
advantages of data hiding for privacy data preservation is its
universal applicability to diﬀerent obfuscation schemes, it is
of interest to consider their performances. We have run the
greedy irreversible scheme with QP = 10 for all 6 videos at
three diﬀerent obfuscation schemes. Table 4 summarizes theEURASIP Journal on Information Security 13
Table 5: Rate and Distortion for irreversible embedding Hall-Monitor at varying QP and δ values.
QP Ro (kbps) Rp (kbps) δR e (kbps) Rate increase % PSNR-Y (dB) PSNR-Y drop % Distortion
5 359.72 161.38
0 754.5 44.79 36.77 3.29 15.76
0.5 698.04 33.96 36.76 3.31 21.06
1 690.54 32.52 36.73 3.39 58.61
10 97.36 81.26
0 314.32 75.97 33.45 3.57 22.59
0.5 285.15 59.64 33.43 3.63 28.53
1 267.50 49.76 33.42 3.66 98.76
15 59.12 54.77
0 202.98 78.22 31.37 3.77 28.64
0.5 186.38 63.65 31.42 3.62 34.95
1 170.50 49.71 31.30 3.99 138.77
20 44.9 42.82
0 152.87 74.27 29.93 3.64 35.39
0.5 141.9 61.76 29.97 3.51 41.92
1 129.1 47.17 29.82 3.99 178.27
results. The ﬁrst row shows the luma PSNR of the sequences
after the embedding and compression. While using a con-
stant quantizer would have produced constant quality in a
normal video encoder, the presence of hidden data degrades
the quality and aﬀects the overall PSNR. The variations
in PSNR can be better interpreted using the percentage
drop as compared with those of the encoded sequences
without hidden data. Also the percentage drop allows us
to compare the impact of data embedding across diﬀerent
obfuscation techniques which produce very diﬀerent video
sequences. These numbers are shown in the second row—
the large drop in PSNR in Minnesota, Two-persons, and
Three-persons is due to the large amount of hidden data
caused by the dynamically moving foreground objects. The
lower PSNR drop in the scrambled versions compared with
the other two is due to the concentration of the hidden
data among the high spatial-temporal frequency scrambled
areas. In a typical residual frame, most DCT coeﬃcients are
close to zero and those coeﬃcients enjoy little distortion
due to quantization. Hiding data in these zero coeﬃcients
statistically causes a higher relative decrease in PSNR when
compared with nonzero coeﬃcients. The scrambling process
introduces many non-zero high frequency coeﬃcients that
attract hidden data, thus reducing the amount of loss in
PSNR as compared to the silhouette and in-painted schemes.
These high-frequency coeﬃcients are chosen because they
introduce less perceptual distortion, as indicated in the
measurements in the third row. On the other hand, these
high-frequency coeﬃcients are very diﬃcult to compress.
The resulting bitrates after data hiding as shown in the
fourth row clearly demonstrate this phenomenon. Similar
to PSNR, we also consider the relative increase in bitrates
as compared with those of compressing the modiﬁed videos
and privacy data separately. While it is expected that the
hidden data introduces minor or even negative bitrate
increase in scrambled videos, there are signiﬁcant increases
in bitrate among silhouette and in-painted sequences—
they range from 26% to more than 100%. These increases
are more signiﬁcant among the in-painted sequences than
the silhouette sequences. To understand these increases, we
calculate the ratio of bitrates of the mark (hidden data)
to the cover work (obfuscated video without hidden data)
in the last row. It is observed that the bitrate increase
correlates well with this ratio. The highest three increases
in bitrate correspond to the bitrate ratios larger than one,
that is, the hidden data is in fact larger in size than the
obfuscated video. This violates a typical assumption used in
most data hiding schemes and it is quite conceivable that our
scheme operates less than eﬃcient in such an extraordinary
condition.
6.4. Diﬀerent Operating Parameters. In the fourth experi-
ment,weranourdatahidingalgorithmundervaryingdesign
parameters like QP and δ. This is carried out on the two
longer sequences: “Hall” and “Conference” using inpaint-
ing as the obfuscation scheme. Irreversible embedding is
examined in this section and reversible embedding in the
following section. Four QP parameters are used: 5, 10, 15,
and 20 and three δ values are used: 0, 0.5, and 1. QP deﬁnes
the quantization parameter of the codec for compressing
both the modiﬁed video and privacy information while δ
is the control parameter between rate and distortion during
the optimization. However, δ = 0 gives the distortion based
optimization ignoring rate increase while δ = 1 minimizes
only the rate increase during the selection of embedding
coeﬃcients. Tables 5 and 6 summarize the results for both
sequences. The notations Ro, Rp,a n dRe denote the rates
of obfuscated (inpainted) bit stream, privacy bit stream
and embedded bit stream, respectively. From the tables,
we can observe, as expected, that the rate increase reduces
while the perceptual distortion increases with an increase
in the control parameter δ. Despite the increase in the14 EURASIP Journal on Information Security
Table 6: Rate and distortion for irreversible embedding for Conference at varying QP and δ values.
QP Ro (kbps) Rp (kbps) δR e (kbps) Rate increase % PSNR-Y (dB) PSNR-Y drop % Distortion
5 122.42 76.17
0 309.27 55.73 38.29 3.28 18.02
0.5 279.37 40.68 38.34 3.16 28.67
1 275.02 38.49 38.29 3.28 60.38
10 49.81 38.44
0 135.50 53.54 34.94 2.57 28.16
0.5 123.63 40.09 34.95 2.54 39.58
1 120.93 37.03 34.84 2.84 94.18
15 36.41 28.66
0 94.12 44.64 33.19 2.35 39.99
0.5 87.97 35.19 33.22 2.27 47.93
1 85.87 31.97 33.05 2.77 134.61
20 30.33 23.96
0 74.23 36.73 31.89 2.39 51.33
0.5 70.66 30.15 31.86 2.48 58.95
1 68.41 26.01 31.85 2.51 161.62
Table 7: Rate and distortion for reversible embedding using either intracoded frames (I) or enhanced intraframes (EI) at varying QP and δ
values.
QP δ Re (kbps) Rate increase Distortion
IE I I E I I E I
Hall monitor
5
0 6357.18 2952.49 34.54 11.86 448.80 137.89
0.5 6225.73 2895.05 31.76 9.69 449.70 149.19
1 6171.53 2877.52 30.61 9.02 791.91 186.96
10
0 4486.32 1460.35 42.65 6.86 177.87 157.18
0.5 4236.80 1441.40 34.72 5.47 205.28 170.34
1 4227.27 1439.44 11.94 5.33 216.24 182.05
15
0 3734.78 1025.34 48.02 5.54 235.81 140.01
0.5 3548.35 1023.92 40.63 5.40 249.32 167.56
1 3520.27 1016.06 39.52 4.59 263.15 244.73
20
0 3228.89 822.79 47.82 7.25 290.19 140.45
0.5 3154.32 812.12 44.41 5.86 291.26 165.05
1 3104.45 810.54 42.12 5.65 306.59 309.36
Conference
5
0 4637.92 2190.74 30.90 3.28 104.69 80.79
0.5 4624.90 2172.82 30.53 2.44 120.08 82.53
1 4602.82 2164.65 29.91 2.05 131.70 103.17
10
0 3292.24 1143.23 41.21 2.19 154.80 118.28
0.5 3280.63 1131.16 40.71 1.11 167.42 120.66
1 3277.95 1128.78 40.60 0.90 248.62 143.75
15
0 2849.20 868.24 47.19 2.02 187.94 106.50
0.5 2845.70 859.10 47.11 0.95 193.69 146.05
1 2820.19 857.51 45.79 0.76 287.39 195.25
20
0 2630.75 739.25 51.21 3.25 207.57 125.42
0.5 2555.75 735.21 46.90 2.68 210.97 157.84
1 2514.27 729.63 44.52 1.90 362.06 251.81EURASIP Journal on Information Security 15
Figure 7: Sample frame (200th) from Hall-Monitor sequence—irreversible embedding at varying QP and δ.R o w sf r o mT o pt oB o t t o m :
Inpainted Frame, Privacy Frame, Data embedded frames with δ = 0,0.5, and 1. Columns from Left to Right: QP = 5, 10, 15, and 20.
bitrates of the privacy streams, the percentages of bitrate
increase in the embedded stream stay the same or drop at
higher QP’s due to the presence of more nonzero coeﬃcients
that are more suitable for hiding data. Also, the results
from both the sequences conﬁrm that PSNR is not a good
measure for the cost computation as it does not vary much
with parameter δ, while the perceptual distortion measure
better correlates with it. Figure 6 highlights the better visual
correlation of the perceptual distortion measure compared
to PSNR for the embedding of same hidden information at
diﬀerent locations by using λ = 0v e r s u sλ = 1. Figure 7
shows a sample frame from Hall-Monitor sequence before
and after irreversible embedding at variable values of QP
and δ.
6.5. Reversible Embedding. T h es a m ee x p e r i m e n tw i t hv a r y -
ingQPandδ isalsorepeatedforthecaseofreversibleembed-
ding. As introduced in Section 4.3, the reversible embedding
can only be used when there is no interdependency between
the frames. Though the embedding is done in a reversible
fashion, the prediction loop used in intercoded frames
propagate the eﬀect of hidden data to future frames making
the process irreversible. Hence this experiment is conducted
in two special encoder structures. In the ﬁrst structure, each
frame is coded using intra mode (I frame) only. This setting
is similar to the M-JPEG standard typically found in many
IP cameras. The privacy information is also encoded in the
same fashion as we assume that the system only has access to
a codec which has no capabilities of temporal prediction. In
the second structure, we operate the embedding process over
theenhancedintraframes(EIframes)ofascalablecodec.We
usetheSNRscalabilitytoderivetheenhancementlayers.The
base layer is always coded at QP = 20 and the enhancement
layers are generated to achieve the desired quantization16 EURASIP Journal on Information Security
Figure 8: Sample frame (200th) from Conference—reversible embedding at varying QP and δ. Rows from Top to Bottom: Inpainted Frame,
Privacy Frame, Data embedded frames with δ = 0, 0.5, and 1. Columns from Left to Right: QP = 5, 10, 15, and 20.
eﬀect. Table 7 summarizes the encoding performances of
the two structures at diﬀerent coding parameters for hall
monitor and sequence. As observed from the table, the EI-
frame structure yields better results in terms of percentage
rate increase and perceptual distortion when compared to
embedding in intra frames (I frames). Figure 8 shows a
sample frame from Conference before and after reversible
embedding on intracoded frames at variable values of QP
and δ.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented a privacy-protecting video
surveillance system which oﬀers multiple levels of secure
privacy information preservation. Novel irreversible and
reversible data hiding methods have been proposed to hide
large amount of privacy information into the host video.
An optimization framework has been proposed to identify
DCT coeﬃcients for hiding information that simultaneously
minimize the perceptual distortion and the rate increase
caused due to embedded information. Extensive experimen-
tal results have been presented to demonstrate the eﬃcient
implementation of our algorithms and their eﬀectiveness in
preserving privacy data.
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